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SINGAPORE’S E-GOVERNMENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE2 34 
Singapore’s e-Government systems have been highly 
rated for their extensive strategic and innovative use 
of information technology (IT) in delivering govern-
ment services. Since the early 1980s,5 Singapore has 
continually introduced new information technologies 
to improve its government business processes. The 
result has been IT-knowledgeable human resources, as 
well as an IT infrastructure that provides citizens with 
                                                 
1 Carol Brown was the accepting Senior Editor for this article. 
2 Accenture. The Government Executive Leadership: e-Government 
Leadership – High Performance, Maximum Value, 2004.  
3 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a severe form of 
pneumonia and a highly transmissible disease that causes flu-like 
symptoms and respiratory problems in patients. 
4 Moon, M. J., “The Evolution of E-Government Among Municipali-
ties: Rhetoric or Reality?” Public Administration Review (62:4), 2002, 
pp. 424-433.  
5 Wong, P. K., “Leveraging the Global Information Revolution for 
Economic Development: Singapore’s Evolving Information Industry 
Strategy,” Information Systems Research (9:4), 1998, pp. 323-341. 
a popular electronic channel for communicating and 
interacting with the government.  
Modernizing its vast government infrastructure using 
IT has been difficult. The process has involved redes-
igning services, introducing over 1600 e-services, and 
learning how to tailor and deploy electronic services. 
The result has been transformed public services. These 
investments proved crucial in 2004 when Singapore 
was hit with the outbreak of SARS. 
THE SARS OUTBREAK: A 
NATIONAL HEALTH CRISIS 
Beginning in 2002, the World Health Organization 
(WHO)6 issued warnings of a spate of mutant viral 
infections that could rapidly spread around the world. 
One such mutation of the corona virus that causes 
atypical pneumonia is known as the Severe Acute 
                                                 
6 World Health Organization SARS Web site, www.who.int/csr/sars/en/ 
last accessed December 31, 2003.  
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The city-state of Singapore has been highly ranked for its e-Government services.2 
Over the past two decades, it has leveraged its IT infrastructure for economic 
development and transformed its public services. The SARS3 outbreak in 2004 
turned into a national health crisis because it spread rapidly and the medical 
community had little knowledge of how to treat the new mutation of the corona 
virus.  
Yet, several Singaporean government agencies utilized the e-Government 
infrastructure4 and related resources to quickly bring the outbreak under control. In 
particular, the government’s IT infrastructure streamlined communications, 
information exchange, and data flow, and significantly eased collaboration among 
government agencies, private businesses, foreign agencies, and the public. By being 
able to coordinate crisis management activities, Singapore was able to keep the 
public up-to-date, enlist help from many sources, and rapidly develop innovative IT 
applications to contain the outbreak. Our findings illustrate the importance of IT in 
helping both public and private enterprises respond effectively to crisis situations, 
where leadership, speed, and coordination are paramount. 
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Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). SARS emerged in 
East Asia in early 2003 and spread globally soon after.  
In most countries, including Singapore, the epicenters 
of infection were hospitals, where undiagnosed pa-
tients infected others. More than two-thirds of the 
cases involved visitors, healthcare workers, and pa-
tients in the vicinity of undetected SARS patients. The 
outbreak in Singapore began with regional travelers 
who fell ill after they returned from Hong Kong and 
were hospitalized with undiagnosed fever at Singapore 
General Hospital (SGH).  
Three patients were soon diagnosed as having SARS, 
but not before they had unknowingly spread the infec-
tion to many people in Ward 58 of SGH, several fam-
ily members, friends, and healthcare workers at SGH. 
Dealing with SARS was particularly difficult because 
there was then no information about the agent respon-
sible for the infection, nor its mode of transmission.  
The people infected by SARS displayed symptoms 
similar to the common flu: high fever accompanied by 
headache, dry cough, and shortness of breath. That is 
why early infections were often wrongly diagnosed as 
the common flu. To make matters worse, SARS was 
easily transmitted by close contact with an infected 
person. That’s why it spread so rapidly at the onset of 
the epidemic. This high initial infection rate also in-
creased the number of deaths. By the end of March 
2003, Singapore had more than 80 cases and four fa-
talities, all arising from just the three initial cases. 
Figure 1 shows the epidemic curve of SARS cases in 
Singapore. 
Singapore’s Response to SARS 
Singapore was the first Asian country to decisively 
tackle this public health threat. The rapid spread of 
SARS in Singapore alarmed the government, and 
caused much public concern, fear, and even paranoia. 
Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, ex-
plained Singapore’s three-prong strategy in his speech 
on April 16, 2003:  
Our national strategy against SARS has three 
prongs:  First, to detect and isolate SARS cases 
as early as possible.  Second, to ring-fence de-
tected or suspected cases, hospitals and clinics 
and personnel treating SARS cases and adopt 
robust screening and infection control proce-
dures. Third, to contain the spread of the virus 
and guard vigilantly against outbreak in the 
wider community. 7  
Implement Widespread Contact Tracing. To detect 
SARS cases, the Singaporean government extensively 
traced people who were either related to SARS pa-
tients or had possibly come in contact with these pa-
tients. This ‘contact tracing’ involved identifying all 
places a patient had visited, and then contacting every 
person who had visited each of those places, to moni-
tor their health. The goal was to be cautious, and even 
quarantine large numbers of people, rather than risk 
suspected SARS patients slipping through the ‘ring 
fences.’  
The government invoked the Infectious Disease Act, 
which directed all people who had come into contact 
                                                 
7 Chung, L. P. and Eong, O. E., SARS War: Combating the Disease (1st 
Ed.), World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2003. 
Figure 1: Epidemic Curve of SARS Cases 
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with an infected person to be quarantined and moni-
tored for possible signs of SARS for ten days, the vi-
rus’s incubation period.8    
An important aspect of contact tracing was imple-
menting ways to identify visitors to establishments, 
and also educating various establishments about 
SARS preventive measures. This process required the 
participation and coordination of many organizations 
                                                 
8 Ministry of Health SARS Web site, www.gov.sg/moh/sars/ last ac-
cessed December 31, 2003. 
in Singapore; Figure 2 shows those organizations. 
(See Appendix B for details about each agency.) 
To coordinate with Singaporean schools and employ-
ers, the Ministry of Health (MOH) involved the Min-
istries of Education (MOE) and Manpower (MOM), 
respectively, to provide contact information and pro-
mote awareness. The Ministry of Community Devel-
opment and Sports (MCDS) guided childcare centers 
on preventive and tracking measures where adults 
often escort their children. The National Environment 
Agency (NEA) was roped in to help manage the data 
on identifying and tracing contacts. A security service 
Figure 2: Singapore’s Agencies and their Coordinating SARS Initiatives 
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agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) 
delivered quarantine orders. The Singapore Tourism 
Board (STB) launched a campaign to educate estab-
lishments on preventive measures. Several grassroots 
agencies, along with the Health Promotion Board 
(HPB), also campaigned to create awareness among 
residents of preventive measures.  
Apart from the efforts within Singapore, the govern-
ment set up fever-monitoring systems at air, sea, and 
land immigration checkpoints at its borders, and also 
regularly exchanged updates with its immediate 
neighbor, Malaysia, and other nearby vulnerable na-
tions.  
Centralize Treatment. To isolate and contain the dis-
ease, Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) was designated 
as the sole hospital to treat SARS patients. All em-
ployees, patients, and visitors to the hospital under-
went tight screening measures (see Figure 3: Left). 
The hospital temporarily halted inter-hospital transfers 
of staff and patients. Healthcare workers were issued 
protective gear, such as masks, gloves, and gowns. On 
March 26, 2003, the Singaporean government even 
announced the drastic measure of shutting down all 
public schools for two days (see Figure 3: Right).9 
Residents were also advised against traveling to China 
and Hong Kong. 
Coordinate Information. As the efforts to detect and 
contain the infection intensified, the numerous agen-
cies needed a way to manage and communicate infor-
mation with each other. The initial spreadsheet-based 
information management system from NEA proved 
insufficient to support the national effort, particularly 
as new infections continued to escalate. So, the Minis-
try of Health called on the Defense Science and Tech-
nology Agency (DSTA) because of its prior experi-
                                                 
9 Emergency Public Information Centre, Singapore, home page, 
www.epic.gov.sg last accessed December 31, 2003. 
ences developing and implementing e-Government 
projects. At the height of the crisis, the Ministry of 
Health asked DSTA to establish an operations center 
within two days’ time to support the 150 staff han-
dling the operations.  
DSTA went further. Within two weeks’ time, it devel-
oped and deployed an information system to support 
large-scale contact tracing and data management at the 
operations center to manage the crisis. The crisis man-
agement involved several agencies coordinating on a 
national basis to quickly clamp down on the spread of 
the SARS infections in Singapore. 
SINGAPORE’S E-GOVERNMENT 
JOURNEY 
Singapore was one of the first countries to develop an 
integrated and coherent approach to computerizing the 
government. Since the early 1980s, Singapore has 
considered IT the key enabler of its global competitive 
advantage. Figure 4 illustrates the major milestones of 
Singapore’s e-Government development from 1980 to 
2006. 
The 1980s. Singapore’s electronic government (e-
Government) initiative began in 1980 with the Civil 
Service Computerization Program. This program set 
the underlying intention of the Singaporean govern-
ment to become a world-class exploiter of IT.   
Since its launch, this program has morphed into the 
National IT Plan, and has evolved with the changes in 
the country’s technological, business, and social cli-
mates. The government has changed how it operates, 
interacts, and services the public. And it has familiar-
ized the civil service workforce with the purpose and 
potential of IT.10  
                                                 
10 Singapore’s early IT adoption and technical support services to the 
Figure 3: SARS Screening at Tan Tock Seng Hospital (left), Notice of Closure of Schools in 
Singapore (right) 
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The 1990s. Through the 1990s, Singapore imple-
mented its vision of building an intelligent island. It 
used the Internet to create a new communications 
channel, foster greater computer use, and popularize 
broadband use in homes, schools, and businesses. To 
support e-business activities, it also developed a sup-
port infrastructure, including legislation and sustained 
development of computer literacy among all sections 
of its society.11 
One goal was to provide integrated services to the 
public through cross-agency links. The government 
was able to increase inter-agency collaboration by 
building a civil-service-wide network that consoli-
dated its computing resources. However, policy coor-
dination among the government agencies turned out to 
be extremely challenging, due to the diverse and in-
tangible goals of the various agencies. So it used high-
level agencies, such as the National Computer Board 
(NCB), to coordinate policy changes across the agen-
cies. In all, the process of integrating resources took 
the government almost a decade, from the late 1980s 
to the late 1990s. 
From 2000 to 2003. In 2000, Singapore launched the 
‘InfoComm 21’ initiative to develop the country, by 
the end of 2003, into a global info-com capital with a 
prosperous e-economy and an info-com savvy e-
                                                 
 
civil service organizations was spearheaded by the National Computer 
Board (NCB) and its IT services wing, the National Computer Services 
(NCS). 
11 Adopted from the Singaporean e-Government Web site 
www.egov.gov.sg last accessed March 15, 2004.  
society. Once the government had set its strategic ob-
jective of national IT adoption, it pushed implementa-
tion via various initiatives.  
Public officers, ministries, and other government 
agencies have been essential in successfully imple-
menting the e-Government strategy. Their buy-in 
played an important role in ensuring that the govern-
ment benefited from the fresh opportunities of new 
technologies. One such initiative was the InfoComm 
Education Program, which ensured that public officers 
gained the IT competencies to revamp internal proc-
esses and external service delivery in their organiza-
tion.  
Singapore’s National Computer Services (NCS) pro-
vided the technical services to the civil services, and 
also played a role in policy-making through the Na-
tional Computer Board. However, as management of 
IT and the support services became complex, the gov-
ernment decided to get out of the technical services 
business. It spun off IT services into a corporate body, 
still called National Computer Services (NCS). Today, 
several private companies compete with NCS to pro-
vide IT services to public agencies. 
As the IT and telecommunications industries grew 
together, the National Computer Board’s role 
morphed into being an integrated agency with the 
Telecom Authority of Singapore (TAS). Its charge is 
to develop and coordinate information and communi-
cation policies in Singapore. The government formed 
the InfoComm Development Agency (IDA) as the 
nodal agency in developing and managing several e-
Figure 4: Major Milestones in the Computerization of the Singaporean Government11  
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Government policies and services. IDA also was to 
prepare Singaporeans “for living and working in the 
New Economy,” where info-com plays a key role. 
Accordingly, several IDA initiatives have been to (1) 
educate the large elderly population in Singapore in 
the basic use of IT, (2) identify and develop next-
generation technologies, and (3) formulate policies to 
provide e-services to all segments of the society. 
From 2000 to 2003, the government began implement-
ing Infocomm 21 via its e-Government Action Plan I. 
This S$1.5 billion project invested in complementary 
infrastructure components. It connected people and 
the government over the Internet, putting paperwork, 
information, and services online. Now, more than 
1,600 services, or 97% of all government services, are 
online, from applying for business licenses to paying 
taxes. An example is the e-Citizen Portal, which is a 
customer-centric, one-stop, on-line portal for citizens 
to transact and interact with the government. Using 
this portal, citizens and businesses save time and 
money when transacting business with multiple agen-
cies.  
Several IT services are outsourced to the private sec-
tor, and several IT government agencies provide tech-
nical services, either with these private service provid-
ers or on their own. The Defense Science and Tech-
nology Agency (DSTA) is one such Singaporean 
agency. IT assists the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) 
and its related agencies, and has played a lead role in 
developing several e-Government services.12 One such 
service was GeBiz, the large Singapore Government 
Electronic Business System that provides a single-stop 
system where all public agencies can post their tender 
offerings and conduct purchasing.  
From 2003 to the Present Time. The Singaporean 
government sees its network and information 
infrastructure as a platform for the country’s future IT 
growth. It has been moving its skill-intensive citizens 
to technology-intensive sectors, such as semiconduc-
tors and telecommunications, and is providing infra-
structure support to maturing technology companies. 
It has also introduced major policy changes and pro-
moted partnerships among public and private organi-
zations to develop new and innovative services for 
citizens. 
These government activities provided the IT founda-
tion for responding to the SARS crisis. Classic risk 
management calls for contingency planning for activi-
ties, such as disaster recovery. However, it is not prac-
tical to anticipate all possible crises, and have a 
scripted response. Singapore’s sustained investment in 
                                                 
12 Devadoss, P. R., Pan, S. L., and Huang, J. C., “Structural Analysis of 
e-Government initiatives: A case study of SCO,” Decision Support 
Systems (34), 2002, pp. 253-269. 
its computing infrastructure and IT skills provided the 
country with the organizational capability to devise 
swift and effective responses to sudden and unex-
pected crises, just as the SARS outbreak demon-
strated. 
USING IT TO COMBAT SARS  
Singapore’s uses of IT in the SARS outbreak were 
varied and widespread, and used a number of different 
technologies. 
Personal Productivity Applications 
Initially Tracked Infection Patterns 
Singapore realized only gradually that it had a health-
care crisis on its hands. Yet, the first responding agen-
cies used IT in many ways to help them better manage 
their data. Several IT applications traced the move-
ment of SARS patients, their contacts, and the health 
of relevant staff and in-patients. For example, Micro-
soft VisioTM, a diagramming program for document-
ing and organizing complex processes, was used to 
plot linkages between contacts at hospitals. In addi-
tion, some technology-savvy doctors used spread-
sheets to set up their own contact tracing system, and 
shared it with MOH and NEA. Furthermore, DSTA 
explored modeling the viral outbreak to visually rep-
resent and study its spread. So, use of IT was both 
sporadic and widespread at the outset of the outbreak. 
During the early stages of managing the crisis, MOH 
operated an operations center with the NEA. MOH 
and hospitals used the government’s e-mail systems to 
exchange data. NEA used spreadsheets to maintain 
lists of infected patients, and their potential contacts, 
who needed to be quarantined. A government security 
office used this list to issue the quarantine orders. This 
list, however, did not always contain up-to-date in-
formation, as it needed to be manually updated – a 
time-consuming effort. As the operations center’s job 
escalated, DSTA took an active role in proposing and 
developing an information system to manage the data 
exchange across agencies.  
Case Management System developed 
for Crisis Mangement 
DSTA began its case management system (CMS) 
work by forming a project team of specialists in net-
working technologies, database administration, system 
development, and testing. The team was given two 
weeks. DSTA had previously developed a casualty 
management system for the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF). It used that system as its basis.  
As shown in Figure 5, the contact tracing system 
needed information from hospitals, MOE, MOH, gen-
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eral practitioners, and Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM) practitioners. 
One of the most difficult challenges the project team 
faced was abrupt changes in system requirements, 
which sometimes occurred daily or even hourly. The 
CMS was designed to provide a long-term solution for 
similar crises, while catering to the immediate needs 
of managing the SARS outbreak.  
The gathered information was entered into a database, 
which allowed the system to perform case manage-
ment should someone be identified as a suspected or 
confirmed SARS patient. Link analysis associated 
confirmed cases with suspected and probable cases, so 
that the health status of potential SARS patients could 
be monitored. This SARS database could also be used 
to provide exit control for the immigration authorities 
(as a commitment of Singapore to regional safety) or 
with MOE to isolate students who might inadvertently 
attend schools when they should be quarantined.   
To contact the Singaporean population quickly, DSTA 
created a reference database of simple contact infor-
mation for the entire population.  
During data collection, DSTA faced several obstacles. 
For one, the lack of established procedures at the op-
erations center hampered its efforts to get the needed 
data. The team had to coax information from the 
spreadsheet owners, and then identify data sources, 
formats, and security issues associated with data. As 
its CIO recounted: 
I was told it might be impossible to gather such 
data, but I approached various government 
CIOs anyway, and they agreed. When one 
agency offered its data, they cautioned that it 
was at least one month old. But I was ecstatic 
because back then I had no data, and any data 
was better than that!   
The handling of such sensitive information also had to 
conform to strict procedures and guidelines that had 
been developed as part of the e-commerce infrastruc-
ture. For privacy protection, only the SARS crisis op-
erations center and the data management group at 
MOH could access the CMS. The CIO explained: 
It was not a free-for-all as far as the data was 
concerned. We had to conform to certain norms 
when handling such data. All data exchange is 
guided by government policies to protect the 
privacy of individuals. Data access in the sys-
tem is tiered into multiple layers and access to 
tiers is controlled by levels of authority. 
Other agencies were not even connected to the CMS 
for data input. Instead, they e-mailed their data to the 
operations center, where staff keyed it into the CMS. 
Figure 5: Information Management Needed for Contact Tracing 
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One problem with this transfer was that the operations 
center used a different data format from the other 
agencies. These formats had to be standardized in the 
CMS.  
The CMS’s data focused on patient information, infec-
tion status, and relation to other patients or contacts. 
The information helped Singapore better understand 
the spread of the infection, and gave it a way to iden-
tify and notify potential at-risk people through its link 
to the reference database.  
Overall, though, data collection was greatly enhanced 
by Singapore’s mature e-Government infrastructure. 
The government and the people were already con-
nected over the Internet. Citizens had access to 1,600 
government services online, and some of these data-
bases helped obtain or verify contact details. In fact, 
these databases became important sources of input to 
the CMS. 
The project team worked on implementation and inte-
gration in parallel, and on data conversion and user 
training during breaks. The CMS gave the government 
the means to monitor the status of SARS across the 
nation, and it had accurate updates from the CMS’s 
data, including quarantine numbers and their status. 
Using the information on the daily CMS report, the 
Minister for Health briefed the nation at daily press 
conferences. The report also went to hospitals and 
other agencies. At the end of the crisis, the CMS was 
handed over to another agency for further develop-
ment and maintenance. 
Radio Frequency ID (RFID) Was Tested 
for Contact Tracing 
During the early days of the SARS outbreak, many 
(undiagnosed) patients in hospitals came in contact 
with many people, causing the infection to spread rap-
idly. To effectively and quickly identify all the per-
sons a patient came in contact with during their stay in 
a hospital, DSTA hosted a gathering of hospital CIOs 
to brainstorm an effective strategy. At that time, many 
hospitals were experimenting with Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), so using RFID was considered 
for tracing contacts. However, it was only deployed on 
a trial basis at one hospital during the crisis. Other 
hospitals had planned to implement it, but did not ac-
complish it before the crisis ended.  
Using this system, every patient was tagged with the 
RFID. Every time the patient came in contact with a 
reader at various points in the hospital, the location 
and time of visit was recorded. This data was stored in 
separate databases not linked to the CMS, and stored 
only for the viral incubation period. When one of 
these people became identified as a potential SARS 
patient, the database could list everyone who had 
come in contact with that person, and they could then 
be quarantined to monitor their symptoms.  
Videoconferencing Improved 
Coordination  
At the outbreak of the epidemic, the Internet was al-
ready actively promoted as a new delivery channel, 
providing both information and transaction-based ser-
vices to the public. The Singapore ONE broadband 
initiative catalyzed the delivery of interactive multi-
media applications and services, and fostered inter-
agency communications. Early on, videoconferencing 
became a critical communication tool linking MOH 
and MINDEF. Without the previously existing and 
fully integrated IT infrastructure, this videoconferenc-
ing system would not have been available so quickly 
after the outbreak.  
In addition, because hospitals were such highly conta-
gious zones, MOH also introduced videoconferencing 
to help patients interact with their visitors, where pos-
sible, without coming into contact with them. 
Webcams were also installed in homes of quarantined 
people, simply by plugging the camera directly into a 
telephone line. MOH monitored the citizens it had 
served with Home Quarantine Orders by requiring 
them to appear before their in-home webcam on-
demand. That was part of the quarantine order.  
Infrared Fever Scanning Detected Early 
Infection 
DSTA also explored the idea of adapting readily 
available thermal imagers (used in the military as 
screening devices) for early SARS detection because 
fever was one of the earliest detectable symptoms for 
SARS. Within one day’s time, DSTA, Singapore 
Technologies Electronics, and Chartered Electro-
optics developed a prototype of the Infrared Fever 
Screening System. In just one week’s time, the team 
was able to verify its effectiveness as a quick and non-
intrusive way to screen people. The device was de-
ployed at the nation's various checkpoints, where 
probable patients were asked to go for a medical ex-
amination. The device did not require a nurse, so the 
nurses who had been stationed at checkpoints to 
screen travelers could return to work in their hospital. 
The Infrared Fever Screening System addressed Sin-
gapore’s urgent need at the height of SARS for a fast, 
safe, and friendly means of mass screening people. As 
a person walked pass the system, an infrared camera 
captured the thermal emissions from the person’s skin, 
and the processed video images were displayed in real 
time with distinct colors indicating normal, feverish, 
or high fever. Being non-intrusive and easy to operate, 
the system was quickly deployed at airports across 
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Asia as the first line of defense against the cross-
border spread of SARS.13   
In fact, the system received commendations from all 
over the world and contributed greatly towards the 
Singaporean government’s efforts to boosts its citi-
zens’ confidence. A government official commented: 
Many SARS affected countries requested that 
we supply them with the infrared scanners to 
help them detect inbound passengers who were 
suspected to have contracted the SARS disease. 
The CIO of DSTA also commented:  
The development of the Infrared Fever Screen-
ing System demonstrated how, as a community, 
we rose to the challenge and made the critical 
difference in a time of crisis. We are proud and 
honored that our innovation has contributed to 
the worldwide fight against SARS. Further-
more, the team developed the concept for the 
system into a working reality in the shortest 
possible time. The work was urgent and in-
tense, a test not only of our technical knowl-
edge but also of our innovativeness and re-
sponsiveness. It was both a thrilling and chal-
lenging time, and we are glad to have re-
sponded to the national call in the fight against 
SARS.  
Singapore drew on several information technologies 
during the outbreak of SARS. Initially, the use of in-
formation technologies was sporadic, yet widespread. 
However, as the government realized the magnitude of 
the outbreak, it created a coherent strategy to effec-
tively deploy its significant infrastructure. 
IT IMPROVED COLLABORATION  
While the use of information technologies proved cru-
cial in fighting SARS, the government’s existing IT 
infrastructure provided the foundation for the crisis 
management effort, not just in terms of its technical 
underpinnings but its culture as well. Development of 
the e-Government infrastructure over the years engen-
dered collaboration, coordination, and IT knowledge 
across agencies. That collaborative culture proved 
important in addressing SARS, and it spread country-
wide during the crisis. 
Among Government Agencies. Containing SARS 
required speed and synergy among many participants. 
Data from various government agencies was needed 
for the contact-tracing database. The Ministry of Fi-
nance, for instance, provided the information on Cen-
                                                 
13 Immigration and Checkpoint Authority, Singapore, home page, 
www.ica.gov.sg last accessed December 31, 2003. 
tral Provident Fund contributors, which accounts for 
virtually everyone in the workforce in Singapore. 
Thus, almost everyone in the country could be identi-
fied from that single database.  
Speed and flexibility – made possible, in part, by IT – 
prevented this national health crisis from going out-of-
control, as it did in China, Vietnam, and other coun-
tries. The government introduced new policies, and 
rapidly identified and improved ineffective measures. 
For instance, NEA used spreadsheets and one hundred 
laptops to manage the initial contact-tracing opera-
tions. But when the scale grew, it quickly changed 
direction, and built a full-scale contact-tracing system 
in just two weeks’ time.  
This schedule, in fact, turned out to be the most ag-
gressive of all the actions that the Singaporean gov-
ernment undertook to prevent the spread of SARS. 
The fast results reaffirm the common belief in 
organizational studies that once a situation has been 
labeled a crisis, decision-makers do mobilize the 
necessary resources to manage it.14 Furthermore, the 
e-Government infrastructure significantly contributed 
to the government’s ability to coordinate the various 
crisis management activities. 
The isolation, preventive, and containment measures 
that the government implemented proved highly effec-
tive because the various agencies could quickly coop-
erate and coordinate their efforts – due to the IT infra-
structure. They were vigilant and pro-active in in-
creasing surveillance and information sharing. The 
agency heads exchanged information, feedback, and 
suggestions for further actions. The CIO of DSTA 
commented:  
Every night, I would go through the e-mails ex-
changed by various heads in the government 
and incorporate their suggestions into the sys-
tem. It was an extremely useful communication 
mechanism. 
With Private and Other Organizations. In collabora-
tion with two major local broadcasting companies, 
MOH launched a channel that focused exclusively on 
SARS. It aired the latest updates, as well as re-runs of 
SARS programs, cable programs from foreign channel 
partners, and public education spots that gave tips on 
precautions people could take against SARS. Feed-
back Unit, a government agency that coordinates pub-
lic feedback on government policies and measures, 
gathered feedback from citizens through its online 
forums and other surveys. This channel provided an 
                                                 
14 Dutton, J., “The Processing of Crisis and Non-Crisis Strategic Is-
sues,” Journal of Management Studies (23:5), 1986, pp. 501-517. 
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important means for citizens to voice their opinions to 
the government through suggestions and comments. 
To educate the public on the causes of SARS and pre-
ventive measures against it, the Singaporean govern-
ment joined hands with community clubs and societies 
to launch campaigns to raise the level of public and 
personal hygiene. The COOL Singapore Award 
launched by the Singapore Tourism Board, the OK 
campaign launched by the Health Promotion Board, 
and the SARS Channel launched by the local broad-
casters were some of the initiatives implemented dur-
ing that period. The Singapore government ensured 
that corrective measures were openly communicated 
to all stakeholders because they were seen as part of 
an effective response strategy.15  
With Foreign Agencies. The Singaporean government 
also collaborated extensively with foreign agencies, 
such as the U.S. Communicable Diseases Center and 
the World Health Organization (WHO), to better un-
derstand the nature of the disease, how it spread, how 
it could be contained, and how to help patients recover 
from it. This collaboration with foreign agencies 
through knowledge sharing and effective communica-
tion was crucial in handling the situation domestically.   
With the Public. Controlling the SARS outbreak in 
Singapore took the combined effort of a determined 
government and a cooperative public. Collaboration 
with the public was essential, so the government en-
couraged two-way communication during the crisis, to 
provide accurate updates on the number of cases and 
to accurately gauge how the nation was reacting. 
MOH was the primary agency in charge of dissemi-
nating updates to all agencies (government agencies, 
the police, and grassroots organizations). The updates 
were meant to spur appropriate actions to contain new 
outbreaks. 
Overall, the Singaporean government won the trust of 
its citizens, in part by assuring them that it was taking 
every possible action to make the nation SARS-free. 
The government fostered greater awareness and social 
responsibility among its citizens, encouraging them to 
help out in their own ways. People took extra care to 
safeguard their own health and the well-being of those 
around them by taking precautionary measures such as 
daily temperature checks and good hygiene.  
Singapore also won acclaim from other countries for 
its swift and rigorous actions in implementing and 
maintaining precautionary measures above and be-
yond WHO’s recommendations. The government ef-
fectively used its infrastructure to continuously rein-
                                                 
15 Pearson, C. and Clair, J., “Reframing Crisis Management,” Academy 
of Management Review (23:1), 1998, pp. 59-76. 
force the social responsibility of Singaporeans during 
the time of crisis.  
In summary, the Singaporean government’s IT capa-
bilities provided the platform on which it developed 
several initiatives to face the crisis. The platform en-
abled communications across agencies, so they could 
share relevant and current information to better man-
age the crisis. Furthermore, agencies could work as 
part of a coordinated national agenda to reinforce the 
national message to the nation and the region. Thus, 
an effective organizational capability yields not only 
appropriate use of information technology but also a 
culture of cooperation. Singapore was able to tran-
scend the political quagmire of multiple agencies, 
each with a separate agenda. It created “tele-
cooperation” through the use of information technol-
ogy. 
CONCLUSION 
The overriding lesson from this study is that execu-
tives can view e-Government as an organizational 
capability that can play a strategic role in adopting, 
integrating, and deploying IT resources and capabili-
ties in crisis situations. However, developing such a 
“national asset” requires sustained IT investment and 
development. It also requires creating a culture of co-
operation.  
These capabilities are applicable to both public and 
private sector organizations because both now operate 
in volatile situations and manage dispersed units, co-
ordinated through IT infrastructures. IT infrastructure 
can be leveraged during times of crisis by both gov-
ernments and private organizations alike. Businesses 
often deal with crises in rapidly changing and complex 
business ecosystems that include webs of partners, 
suppliers, and customers. Having already invested 
significantly in an infrastructure for operation, busi-
nesses, like a government, can leverage their infra-
structure during a crisis to support collaboration and 
information exchange, to make effective, timely deci-
sions. 
The Singapore experience suggests that organizations 
need to think ahead about how they can adapt their 
existing IT resources and capabilities in times of cri-
ses. The SARS crisis illustrates the importance of co-
ordination among agencies to bring coherence to crisis 
response. Efficient communication channels and a 
shared platform enhance decision-making and execu-
tion. Singapore’s experience also underscores the role 
of leadership in envisioning innovative measures to 
conduct relief operations.   
Every crisis is inherently different. Hence, it is im-
practical to prepare for all eventualities. However, the 
IT infrastructure, technology resources, human IT tal-
  Lessons from Combating SARS in Singapore 
 
 
© 2005 University of Minnesota   MIS Quarterly Executive Vol. 4 No. 4 / December 2005 395
ent, and collaboration capabilities are assets that will 
benefit crisis management activities. Organizations 
should develop their IT capabilities with these addi-
tional uses in mind. Organizations should develop new 
IT capabilities with these additional uses in mind. 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 
METHODOLOGY 
This research aimed to answer two questions. First, 
how did Singapore’s prior investments in e-
Government enable the development of the needed 
capabilities for SARS containment? Second, how did 
government agencies and ministries in Singapore co-
ordinate their information activities and collaborate 
during the SARS crisis? Our goal was to determine 
how the government leveraged its existing IT re-
sources and capabilities to respond effectively to the 
sudden outbreak of SARS. Our unit of analysis was 
the entire Singaporean government. By analyzing the 
actions the government took and the decisions it made 
in response to the outbreak, we better understand the 
issues, problems, and events that occurred over the 
course of combating SARS in Singapore.  
To obtain a breadth of information, opinion, and ac-
counts of experience, we interviewed 18 executives in 
the Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) 
between August and November 2003. All the inter-
views, which were about one and one-half hours in 
duration, were transcribed and analyzed. The selected 
interviewees provided the full range of technological 
support during the crisis, and coordinated extensively 
with other agencies at all levels. The information col-
lected during the personal interviews focused on the 
participants’ understanding of the crisis, and their con-
tribution, experiences, and perceptions.  
Secondary research included reading the extensive 
news coverage of the outbreak in Singapore, press 
releases from different government agencies, adviso-
ries for precautions against SARS, and articles from 
multiple newspapers and other SARS-related Internet 
publications in Singapore. This secondary research 
helped identify the key capabilities of e-Government 
that the government had developed over two decades.  
We used the interview transcripts and meeting min-
utes to create a detailed history of the events, the IT 
resources used, the government’s decisions, and its 
actions during the SARS outbreak. We used Grant’s16 
classification scheme for resources to identify the IT 
resources involved in the entire crisis management 
process. We verified our analysis by reviewing litera-
ture on e-Government and capabilities development.  
                                                 
16 Grant, R., Contemporary Strategy Analysis, Blackwell Publishers 
Inc., Oxford, UK, 1995. 
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Appendix B: Singaporean Government Agencies and Their Roles in Combating SARS 
Agency Role 
  
Ministry of Health 
(MOH) 
• Disseminate information and updates on SARS to all agencies 
• Issue advisories  
• Work/collaborate with all government agencies and statutory boards. 
Monitor overall responses. 
 
 
Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM) 
• Take care of compensation and benefits of workers affected by SARS 
• Take care of illegal immigrant issues 
• Inform foreign workers about SARS through packages in their native lan-
guage 
• Work with employers and employees to help prevent the spread of SARS 
in the workplace 
• Guard against the import of SARS through the arrival of foreign workers 
 
Ministry of Education 
(MOE) 
• Distribute thermometers and information kits to school children 
• Clean schools and perform daily temperature checks 
• Manage education efforts on SARS, including introducing a SARS module 
in schools 
• Assure parents of a safe SARS-free environment for school children 
 
 
Ministry of Home  
Affairs (MHA) 
• Collaborate with Malaysian counterparts on SARS containment measures 
• Exchange timely and accurate medical information about SARS with Ma-
laysia 
• Work hand-in-hand with MOH to disseminate information to the public; re-
assure the public to avoid panic; and encourage the public to cooperate  
 
National Environment 
Agency (NEA) 
• Ensure cleanliness and hygiene in public places, such as food centers, 
public restrooms, schools, condominiums 
• Distribute kits (thermometers, brochures) to hawkers 
• Assure the public of the safety of hawker centers and marketplaces 
• Handle initial contact tracing of index patients 
 
 
Singapore Tourism 
Board (STB) 
• Initiate the Singapore COOL Certification Award to encourage hotels and 
other tourism facilities to implement SARS preventive measures 
• Secure alternative accommodation (e.g., resorts) for visitors or students 
under quarantine 
 
Immigration and 
Checkpoints Authority 
(ICA) 
• Provide health declaration cards at all immigration points 
• Perform pre-departure and on-arrival passenger and crew health checks 
at all immigration points (land, sea, and air) 
• Work with Malaysia counterparts to develop a set of protocols to control 
the spread of SARS across land and sea checkpoints 
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Agency Role 
 
 
Civil Aviation Authority 
of Singapore (CAAS) 
• Issue directives to airlines 
• Conduct passenger/crew health checks 
• Provide health declaration cards at airports 
• Provide financial assistance to airport shop tenants and airlines affected 
by the SARS outbreak 
• Ensure compliance with SARS preventive measures at the airport 
 
Defense Science and 
Technology Agency 
(DSTA) 
• Provide the technology infrastructure for contact tracing, thermal scanners 
for detecting fever, and hospital patient tracking system 
• Design and deploy contact tracing applications at the MOH Operations 
Center 
 
 
Ministry of Community 
Development and 
Sports (MCDS) 
• Close childcare centers to prevent future spread of SARS 
• Implement measures to raise awareness and ensure high standards of 
precautions and hygiene at childcare centers 
• Provide public education via “advertorials” in the four official languages of 
Singapore to inform people about SARS 
 
Health Promotion 
Board (HPB) 
• Create awareness about SARS via posters, advertisements, etc. 
• Provide emotional support to the public 
 
Tan Tock Seng  
Hospital (TTSH) 
• Serve as the battleground for the SARS war 
• Isolate and house SARS patients, in-patients, and out-patients 
• Provide ambulance service for suspected SARS cases 
• Provide SARS screening  
• Implement preventive measures for hospital visitors, staff, and healthcare 
workers 
 
 
CISCO 
(a security service 
agency) 
• Deploy and install e-PIC cameras in homes of quarantined patients 
• Issue Home Quarantine Orders (HQOs) to prospective SARS cases 
• Call up and monitor people on HQOs 
 
Ministry of National 
Development (MND) 
• Check and repair sanitary pipes, and disinfect residential areas 
• Provide alternative supplies of vegetables on closure of the PPWC vege-
table wholesale center following the discovery of SARS cases there 
• Provide financial assistance to those affected by the PPWC closure 
• Conduct surveys to assess the level of public confidence in fighting SARS 
